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final-audit-report.md

final-audit-report.md 9.9 KB
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Security Audit Report — sm121-launcher

Scope: whole repository (manual deep review) Date: 2026-07-31 Method: manual source + data-flow audit (the audit skill's automated phases — CodeQL, Semgrep Pro, sub-agent Review Chambers, real-VM PoCs — were not runnable in this environment; no such tooling is installed). Findings below are based on direct code reading and remote-shell data-flow tracing in src/.

1. Executive Summary

sm121 is an operator-run CLI that drives SSH (russh) to launch vLLM/SGLang inference containers on a small fleet of trusted DGX Spark nodes. The overall architecture is defensible: host keys are pinned and verified per connection, script uploads are base64-encoded, and the highest-touch data-flow paths (resolve_path_ref_on_node, composed-model dirs) already apply careful shell quoting. The tool is not designed to face untrusted input directly.

The material risks are all on the trust boundary assumption: every configured recipe, config.toml value, and mount path is executed as privileged shell on the DGX nodes (docker run, before_serve, mods, sync). Two concrete gaps were found where attacker-influenced recipe/config content reaches a remote shell without the quoting discipline used elsewhere:

  1. MEDIUM — image sync pipes the operator's private SSH key to an unverified host (src/docker/sync.rs:111)
  2. MEDIUM — unquoted docker run interpolation lets a crafted recipe inject shell (src/docker/command.rs)

Two lower-severity / hygiene items (HA token over cleartext HTTP; TOFU host-key bootstrap) are documented for awareness. One notable positive: host-key verification is mandatory — the client refuses to connect when no key is pinned.

2. Threat Model

  • Trusted actors: the operator and the DGX cluster hosts (a closed deployment).
  • Trust anchors: local config.toml (gitignored), the recipes/ tree, and the operator's SSH private key.
  • Attackers considered: an external adversary who can (a) get a malicious recipe/config committed or supplied to the operator, (b) impersonate/MITM a node IP during image sync, or (c) observe traffic on the control LAN. A fully compromised node is out of scope (it already has the operator's trust).
  • Boundary: SSH commands constructed from config/recipe values and executed on nodes with channel.exec (→ remote shell). Any metacharacter in those values is a candidate injection primitive.

3. Findings

F1 — MEDIUM (FIXED): Image sync disables host-key verification and ships the operator key

File: src/docker/sync.rs (sync_image_to_nodes). Status: remediated — the inner ssh docker load now uses -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes -o UserKnownHostsFile=<per-target known_hosts>; the target's public key is fetched over a verified russh session and written to a temporary known_hosts on the source node (removed after the pipe). An impersonator at target.ssh_ip is rejected before auth.

let pipe_cmd = format!(
    "docker save {} | ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i {} {}@{} docker load",
    shq(image), shq(key), shq(user), shq(target.ssh_ip));

Impact: If an attacker can impersonate target.ssh_ip (ARP spoofing on a shared LAN, or a stale/mistyped IP in config) during a multi-node sync, the inner ssh presents the operator's private key (-i <key>) and accepts any host key. The attacker receives the key material and/or injects a malicious docker load onto a DGX node. The outer russh hop is verified, but the inner one is not.

Condition: cluster.nodes.len() > 1 + sync_image + an image to copy. Not hit by single-node deployments.

Repro: configure a second node whose ssh_ip is a host under attacker control that answers TCP/22; run a multi-node serve with sync_image. The attacker gets the -i key.

Note: The exact StrictHostKeyChecking=no behavior with -o prefixed options ordering should also be re-checked (OpenSSH may still prompt=hang for unknown keys; the bypass intent is what matters here).

Recommendation: Do not reuse the operator key with StrictHostKeyChecking=no. Reuse the verified russh session to stream the image (pipe over the authenticated channel) instead of an inner ssh, or pin the peering host keys and use -o StrictHostKeyChecking=yes HostKeyAlgorithms=....

F2 — MEDIUM (FIXED): Unquoted docker run interpolation → remote shell injection

File: src/docker/command.rs, src/docker/tail.rs. Status: remediated — every interpolated value in the assembled docker run command is now shell-quoted via shq: -e 'K=V', -v 'host':'container'[:ro], --name/--label values, the cache-dir and mods mounts, and every tail word (entrypoint, model, args, flags). Two regression tests (malicious_env_value_cannot_inject, malicious_mount_container_cannot_inject) assert the quoting holds.

.map(|(k, v)| format!("-e {k}={v}"))            // recipe.[env], mount env names
format!("-v {}:/root/.cache/huggingface", ctx.cache_dir)
format!("-v {}:{}", m.host, m.container)         // extra_mounts resolved host/container

The whole docker run ... string is joined and executed via run_ssh → channel.exec(true, ...) (remote shell). Unlike the careful shq() usage elsewhere (cleanup, path refs, stop_cluster), these fields are not shell-quoted.

Impact: A recipe [env] entry or extra_mounts container/host path containing shell metacharacters — e.g. FOO = "$(id > /tmp/pwned)", container = "/x; touch /y" — executes arbitrary commands as root on the GPU node at serve time.

Condition: Attacker must get attacker-controlled content into a recipe/config (the operator-authored trust boundary). This is not remotely reachable on its own, but it is the concrete way a malicious recipe in the shared repo escalates to full node execution, and it is inconsistent with the shq-everywhere convention in the same tree.

Recommendation: Shell-quote each -e value and each -v host/container path (the flag names and : separators stay literal) before joining. Validate or quote the --name sm121_{recipe_name}_{rank} slot too.

F3 — LOW: Home Assistant token is transmitted in cleartext

File: src/home_assistant.rs (new), and config.toml [home_assistant] url = "http://ha.lan:8123".

Impact: The long-lived HA bearer token travels as Authorization: Bearer <tok> over plaintext HTTP on the control LAN. A passive observer (or MITM) can recover a token that grants broad HA API access (entity control), and can spoof power-on/off.

Condition: HA endpoint served over http:// (as currently configured) and an observer on the LAN path.

Recommendation: Terminate HA behind TLS and set url = "https://...".

F4 — INFO: TOFU host-key bootstrap & long-lived token in config

Files: src/host_keys.rs, src/main.rs.

  • init-host-keys pins whatever key the server presents on first contact (trust-on-first-use). A MITM during the first run would be pinned. Standard for this tool class; acceptable, but worth documenting and verifying the pin out-of-band once.
  • The HA token lives in plaintext in config.toml. It is gitignored (verified, config.toml is in .gitignore), so it is not committed. It is, however, present in the local working tree. Restrict file mode (e.g. chmod 600 config.toml) and treat the token as a long-lived credential with broad HA API access.

Confirmed-strong controls (no action)

  • Host key verification is enforced: ssh_session_with_timeout bails if host_key is unset; VerifyingHandler compares a SHA-256 of the presented key against the pinned fingerprint (src/ssh.rs). Good.
  • Script uploads / dir uploads are base64-encoded with shell-quoted local paths (upload_script, upload_dir in src/ssh.rs). Good.
  • Model path-ref resolution (resolve_path_ref_on_node) and composed-model dir (docker/compose.rs) carefully shq() every path component, and validate glob/exclude to an allow-list of [A-Za-z0-9*?._-/] to prevent injection. Good.
  • Config/recipe/TOML are parsed with standard toml/serde; no unsafe deserialization (no serde_json::Value from untrusted input entering code paths).

4. Methodology Summary

Adapted the audit skill (10-phase) to a manual, single-agent run: repository inventory → dependency/SBOM review (Cargo.toml) → threat-model construction → data-flow tracing of every place a config/recipe value reaches a remote shell → inline enrichment (is input attacker-controlled? does it cross a trust boundary?) → severity calibration with the trusted-operator threat model. Automated SAST phases (CodeQL, Semgrep Pro, sub-agent chambers) were not run — the tools are not installed in this environment, so results here are qualitative.

5. Findings Summary

ID Severity Title Status
F1 MEDIUM Image sync uses StrictHostKeyChecking=no and ships the operator key FIXED
F2 MEDIUM Unquoted docker run env/mount interpolation → remote shell injection FIXED
F3 LOW HA bearer token sent over cleartext HTTP open
F4 INFO TOFU host-key bootstrap; long-lived HA token in config file open

6. Conclusion

The codebase is generally well-structured for its trust model, with notably strong host-key pinning and careful quoting in the trickiest path-resolution code. The two Medium findings both sit on the "recipe/config content is privileged" boundary and are the highest-value hardening targets: (F1) never hand the operator key to an unverified inner ssh, and (F2) apply the same shq discipline already used elsewhere to every docker run interpolation. Recommend fixing both before any deployment where recipes may be sourced from a less-trusted location. No remotely-exploitable, unauthenticated vulnerability affecting the intended (single-operator, pinned-cluster) deployment was found.